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Summary 
 
  General equilibrium optimizing models with sticky nominal prices allow us to revisit 
questions about optimal monetary policy in open economies.  If nominal prices are set in 
producers’ currencies, appropriate monetary policy can reproduce the allocations under flexible 
prices.  If nominal prices are set in consumers’ currencies, stable nominal exchange rates may be 
desirable.  In this case, a nominal exchange rate fixed at the PPP level can have desirable 
consequences for risk sharing, and nominal exchange rate flexibility cannot deliver optimal 
relative price changes.  However, evidence shows that pass-through may be greater to import 
prices than to consumer prices.  If prices are fixed for consumers, but importer-distributors face 
pass-through, then monetary policy makers face a trade-off that might require some control of 
nominal exchange rates, but not purely fixed rates. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  The “new open economy macroeconomics” is an exciting new development that revives 
Keynesian IS-LM style analysis, but within a framework of optimizing agents.  The literature has 
the advantage that policy recommendations can be based explicitly on a criterion of maximum 
household welfare, instead of some ad hoc criterion.  This new literature has some interesting 
initial results on optimal policy and exchange-rate flexibility. 
  I will examine some “new open economy macroeconomic” models under three separate 
assumptions about how nominal prices are set.  In all cases, there are some nominal prices that I 
assume are set for one period.  I shall examine static versions of the models, since I will be able 
to discuss the relevant issues in that simplified framework.    
I will first construct the model under nominal price flexibility, and then compare that 
model to the sticky-price models.  In the first sticky-price model, prices are set in the currency of 
the producer.  (This is the PCP model, for “producer-currency pricing”.)  This means that there is 
full pass-through of nominal exchange rate changes to consumer prices.  That is, the price in the 
home country of a foreign good moves one-for-one with changes in the nominal exchange rate.  
In this framework, changes in the nominal exchange rate translate into changes in the relative 
price of home-produced to foreign-produced goods.  As the nominal exchange rate changes, 
consumers’ demand for home relative to foreign goods is altered. 
The second model is one in which the home and foreign market are segmented, and firms 
set two different prices – one in domestic currency for home consumers, and one in foreign 
currency for foreign consumers.  There is a body of empirical evidence to suggest that consumer 
prices are not very responsive to exchange rate changes, so this pricing assumption is consistent  
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with that evidence.
1  This model is labeled the LCP model (for “local-currency pricing.”)   In this 
model, changes in the nominal exchange rate have no short-run effect on prices faced by 
consumers, and thus have no influence on the relative demand for home versus foreign goods. 
  However, while consumer prices are not very responsive to exchange rate changes, there 
appears to be more pass-through of exchange rate changes to imported good prices.  That is, 
there is a distinction between import prices and consumer prices, that presumably is related to the 
role of distributors in the economy.
2  So, the third model has a (competitive) distribution sector 
that imports goods, and then sells them to consumers.  Final prices are set in the consumers’ 
currencies, but the opposite assumption is made about import prices – that there is full pass-
through.  Because exchange rate changes affect prices faced by distributors, they affect the 
distributors’ relative demands for home and foreign goods.  But nominal exchange rate 
movements still have no effect on consumer demand. 
  The literature (Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2002)) has shown that in the PCP setting, it is 
not desirable for monetary policy to target exchange rates.  An appropriate monetary policy can 
replicate the allocations under flexible exchange rates, and the optimal policy can be achieved 
without any coordination between monetary authorities.  In contrast, Devereux and Engel (2001) 
have shown that under the LCP setting, fixing nominal exchange rates is the outcome of optimal 
monetary policy.  I review these arguments below in the context of a general model that can 
allow for different assumptions on pricing.  I then argue that the third model – which is perhaps 
the most plausible empirically – has intermediate implications for exchange-rate targeting.  It is 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Engel (1993, 1999, 2000), Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001), Rogers and Jenkins (1995), Obstfeld 
and Taylor (1997), and Parsley and Wei (2001a, 2001b).  Mussa’s (1986) classic paper stimulated much of this 
research. 
 
2   See Goldberg and Knetter (1995) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) for some evidence on this point.  
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desirable to have less exchange rate flexibility than under PCP, but fixed exchange rates would 
not be optimal either. 
These models are fully-integrated equilibrium models in which households and firms 
make optimal choices, but in which some nominal prices are not completely responsive to 
shocks.  I will work with a simplified framework in which I can embed all of the approaches I 
want to discuss.  Section 2 lays out the general model.  Section 3 finds the solutions under 
flexible goods prices.  Section 4 investigates the PCP case, and section 5 the LCP case.  In 
section 6, I lay out the model with distributors.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  The General Model 
  There are two countries in the general model.  I will assume that there is a single period, 
though most of the results I discuss carry over to a multi-period framework.  I assume 
households in the home country maximize: 
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C  is a consumption aggregate.   
Households consume goods produced in the home country and in the foreign country.  I 
will assume that aggregate consumption is a CES function of home and foreign consumption 
aggregates: 
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Here, λ  is the elasticity of substitution between the home and foreign aggregates.   H C  is an 
aggregator of consumption of goods produced in the home country, and  F C  is likewise for goods 
produced in the foreign country.  We assume that there is a continuum of such goods in each  
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country.  The consumption function for each of these sub-indexes of consumption is also CES, 
with an elasticity of substitution (possibly) different than λ .   
 Real  balances, 
P
M
D
, appear in the utility function, where P  is the optimal price index 
given by: 
(2)  () λ λ λ α α − − − − + = 1
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  Households get disutility from work, L.  η  is a shock to disutility of work.   
  Foreign households are assumed to have similar utility functions:   
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Starred  (*) variables are the foreign household counterparts to the home-country variables. 
  Money is supplied exogenously through transfers.  In equilibrium we have money supply 
equals money demand in each country: 
D M M = , and 
* * D M M = .  Four variables will 
determine the aggregate state of the economy: the distaste for work for the representative home 
agent, η ; the analogous variable for the representative foreign agent, 
* η ; aggregate per capita 
home money supply, M ; and aggregate per capital foreign money supply, 
* M . 
  I will assume there are complete financial markets of the type discussed in Devereux and 
Engel (2001).  Specifically, there are assets traded that have payoffs specific to each possible 
state of the world.  These assets are traded, of course, prior to the realization of the state.  Most 
of the models we consider have home and foreign consumers facing different prices for the same 
good on spot markets.  That is, the markets are segmented.  We assume that it is impossible to 
make state-contingent trades that allow payoffs in physical goods, as that would allow 
households to get around paying the price set in their market.  Instead, payoffs are specified in  
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nominal terms.  In that case, optimal contracts ensure that the marginal utility from an additional 
unit of currency is proportional between home and foreign consumers in all states (where I have 
assumed the constant of proportionality is one): 
(3) 
*
*
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= . 
S  is the nominal exchange rate, expressed as the home currency price of foreign currency. 
  The assumption of complete markets is, of course, unrealistic.  It is a useful benchmark, 
and here it allows us to arrive at a simple flexible model that can be used to analyze relative-
price effects in general equilibrium.  We can show that nominal exchange rate flexibility allows 
desirable relative price adjustments to occur rapidly under the assumption of nominal prices 
fixed in producer’s currencies, but we can also analyze other assumptions about how prices are 
set. 
  The following equilibrium conditions emerge using the first-order conditions for the 
household optimization problem: 
(4) 
ρ χ PC M =  
ρ χ
* * * C P M =  
(5) 
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ρ η
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Here, W  and 
* W  are the home and foreign wage, respectively. 
  Also, demand for home and foreign goods (by home consumers – foreign consumption 
demands are identical as functions of foreign prices and consumption) are given by: 
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  The solution for the nominal exchange rate does not depend on any assumptions about 
the production side of the economy, or about how nominal prices are set:  
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(7) 
* M
M
S = . 
  Now we turn to the production side of the economy.  There is a continuum of goods 
produced in each country, each by a monopolist (who faces a constant elasticity of demand, 
given our CES assumption on preferences.)  Output for each firm i is produced using only a labor 
input:  i i L Y = , and 
* *
i i L Y = .   
With a population of  2
1  in each country, we have employment given by: 
(8) 
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We now examine this general model under various assumptions about price setting. 
  
3.  Flexible Nominal Prices 
  First is the case of completely flexible nominal goods prices.  Since firms face constant 
elasticity demand curves, they set prices as a constant mark-up over wages.  We allow firms to 
discriminate across home and foreign markets.  But because we assume identical preferences and 
CES utility, firms choose to set the same price in both markets.   
  Aggregating across all home firms, we get 
(9)  W PH µ = , 
where  H P  is the home currency price of home goods.  We have also 
*
H H SP P = , where 
*
H P  is the 
foreign-currency price of home goods.  Likewise,  
(10) 
* * W PF µ = , 
and 
*
F F SP P = .  µ  ( 1 > ) represents the mark-up. 
  We can also derive these equations for nominal wages in equilibrium:  
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  It follows from the equilibrium conditions (4) and (5) that 
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The relative price of home goods falls when there is an increase in η , which is the parameter 
measuring the distaste for work.  When home households prefer to work less, home firms must 
pay higher wages to entice workers into the workforce.  Those wage costs are passed onto to 
consumer in the form of higher prices. 
  Substituting the solutions for prices, (9) and (10), into the price index definition (2), we 
get: 
(13)  () λ λ λ η α αη
χ
µ − − − − + = 1
1
1 * 1 ) 1 (
M
P . 
From the money market equilibrium condition and using equation (13), we can derive the 
expression for equilibrium consumption: 
(14)  () ) 1 (
1
1 * 1
1
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−
− + = C . 
Because purchasing power parity holds in this model, 
* SP P = , we know from the risk-sharing 
condition (3) that home and foreign consumption will be identical: 
* C C = .  Labor supply shocks 
(both home and foreign) have identical effects on home and foreign consumption. 
  The equilibrium levels of employment in each country depend on the relative shocks.  
Since consumption demands are identical in each country, employment is given by: 
   H C L =   F C L =
*  
Using the demand functions (6), we derive:  
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The supply shocks affect employment differentially across the home and foreign country.
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4.  Sticky Nominal Prices: PCP Case 
  Next is a model where firms must set nominal prices in advance – prices are set in 
advance of knowledge of the preference shocks and money supply realizations.   First we take up 
the case in which firms set prices in their own currencies.  That is, home firms set prices in the 
home currency, whether for sale to home or foreign households.  This is the PCP model.  
  Because of identical preferences of home and foreign households, firms do not set a 
different price for home and foreign households (even though, in principle, we allow for price 
discrimination.)  That is, the law of one price holds for goods sold at home and in the foreign 
country. 
  It follows that 
(17) 
* *
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Under the PCP assumption, both  H P  and 
*
F P  are fixed ex ante and do not respond to shocks to 
demand or money supply.  Define 
*
F
H
P
P
≡ κ .  Because these nominal prices are set in advance of 
                                                 
3 Of course, we want to assume that the labor supply shocks are genuine shocks, not somehow under the control of 
the household, and that the shocks are verifiable.  That is because households buy and sell bonds that are contingent 
on the realization of the shocks, so they have the incentive to claim a positive shock to the disutility of work.  As 
equations (14), (15), and (16) show, if home residents could claim falsely such a positive shock, their work levels 
would fall, foreigners’ work levels would increase, and foreigners share the burden of lost consumption.  
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the realization of the state, κ  does not depend on the outcomes of the random variables.  Then 
the relative price of home to foreign goods varies inversely with the exchange rate: 
S P
P
F
H κ
= . 
Substituting in the expression for the equilibrium exchange rate, we get under PCP pricing: 
(18) 
M
M
P
P
F
H
*
κ = . 
  In fact, we can find monetary policy rules that allow the equilibrium to exactly mimic the 
flexible price equilibrium: 
(19)  H P M
µη
χ
=  
*
*
*
F P M
µη
χ
= .  
  Using these expressions, and 
*
H H SP P =   and 
*
F F SP P = , we get: 
* *
*
η
η
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, 
which is exactly the expression for relative prices under flexible exchange rates, equation (12).  
This result depends on nominal exchange rate flexibility.  Monetary rules target local supply 
shocks (i.e., home money targets home supply shocks, foreign money targets foreign supply 
shocks.)  The equilibrium exchange rate is given by equation (7). 
  Using equation (19), the money market equilibrium conditions (4), and the definition of 
the price index (2), we find that aggregate consumption, C , is exactly the same as in the flexible-
price model, given in equation (14).  Since purchasing power parity holds, the risk-sharing 
condition gives us that 
* C C = , as in the flexible-price model.  
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  Using the same equations, along with the demand equations (6), we find that employment 
in the PCP model under the specified monetary reaction functions is identical to the flexible 
price employment levels, given by equations (15) and (16). 
  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) demonstrate that mimicking the flexible price allocation is 
the constrained globally efficient monetary policy.  While the flexible-price equilibrium itself is 
not Pareto efficient (because of the monopoly distortions), optimal monetary policy can do no 
better than to replicate the flexible-price allocation.  Moreover the monetary policy I set out 
above is, as Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) show, the policy that self-interested national economic 
planners would follow.  That is, there is no gain to international monetary coordination.  Central 
banks following policies that maximize their own country’s welfare can achieve the constrained 
globally efficient outcome. 
  This model, however, has implications that are counterfactual: that exchange rate changes 
are passed through one-for-one into consumer prices, and that the law of one price holds for all 
goods.  It is this characteristic of the model that has led some researchers to consider the local-
currency pricing version of the sticky-nominal price model. 
 
5.  Sticky Prices: LCP Case 
  An alternative model for price setting is that firms set prices in the currency of consumers 
of the product.  That is, when a home firm sells in the home market it sets prices in the home 
currency.  But for sales to the foreign market, it sets prices in the foreign currency.  We call this 
the “LCP” (for “local currency pricing”) case.  Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000), and Chari, 
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) are examples of models that have made the LCP assumption. 
  It follows immediately in this case that a flexible nominal exchange rate cannot achieve 
the optimal relative price adjustment.   h P  and  f P  are both set in the domestic currency and do  
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not respond to contemporaneous shocks.  We cannot replicate the flexible-price solution of 
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 with flexible exchange rates, no matter what the monetary policy.      
  Labor supply allocations, therefore, cannot match the equilibrium labor allocations under 
flexible prices.  We have, for example,  C
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and 
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 are both fixed ex ante – and thus not responsive to supply shocks – it follows that 
supply shocks affect  H C  and 
*
H C  only through their influence on C  and 
* C .  Under flexible 
prices, equation (15) shows that home employment, L, is inversely related to home leisure 
preference shocks, η .  With home employment given by 
*
2
1
2
1
H H C C L + = , we would somehow 
need to have a policy where C  and 
* C  respond inversely to η  in order to replicate the flexible-
price behavior for L.  But such a policy would then make it impossible to replicate the flexible 
price outcomes for C  and 
* C  given in equation (14), or the flexible price solution for foreign 
employment given in equation (16).   
 Since 
* C C = , monetary policy could replicate the flexible price outcome for aggregate 
consumption, but only if monetary reaction functions respond identically in the home and foreign 
country to shocks.  That is, if 
(20)  () ) 1 (
1
1 * 1 1 ) 1 ( λ λ λ η α αη χµ −
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− − − − + = P M , 
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1
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then the consumption levels under flexible prices, given by equation (14), can be replicated 
under LCP.  Devereux and Engel (2001) show that these policies are optimal under LCP.  They 
imply that exchange rates will be fixed at the PPP level:   
(22) 
* * P
P
M
M
S = = . 
There is a simple way to understand the striking difference in optimal policy in the PCP 
world versus the LCP world.  There are two types of deviations from efficiency which monetary 
policy might be able to rectify in a sticky-price world.  One is that relative prices might not 
respond in the correct way to real shocks, so that we might not achieve 
* *
*
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η
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.  In the 
absence of optimal relative price changes, consumers do not receive the correct signals and do 
not alter their demand for goods in the appropriate way when real shocks hit.  As a consequence, 
resources will not be allocated efficiently. 
  The other type of inefficiency comes because deviations from purchasing power parity 
lead to incomplete risk sharing.  As noted above, with a complete set of nominal contingent 
claims traded, in equilibrium 
*
*
SP
C
P
C
ρ ρ − −
= .  Asset markets do not deliver complete risk sharing 
unless purchasing power parity holds, 
* SP P = . 
  When prices are set in producers’ currencies (PCP), purchasing power parity holds, so 
asset markets deliver complete risk sharing.  In that case, monetary policy can be devoted 
entirely toward ensuring that relative prices respond in the appropriate way to real shocks. 
  Under local currency pricing, relative prices cannot change in the short run in response to 
real shocks.  It is useless for monetary policy makers to devote any effort to achieving an 
efficient relative price response.  But, under LCP pricing, both P  and 
* P  are predetermined and  
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not affected by real shocks.  If the nominal exchange rate is fixed so that purchasing power parity 
holds, asset markets will achieve complete risk sharing.   
  This model is also apparently consistent with the empirical evidence that consumer prices 
are unresponsive to exchange rate changes in the model.  The law of one price does not hold in 
the model: 
*
h h SP P ≠  and 
*
f f SP P ≠ .    
  In essence, Devereux and Engel (2001) take the evidence against the law of one price for 
consumer goods as support for the position that nominal exchange rate changes are not capable 
of achieving desirable relative price changes. 
 
6.  Imports as intermediates 
  Consider this alternative interpretation of the general model.  Consumers in each country 
get utility from a single consumption product.  In the home country, that consumption is C and in 
the foreign country, it is 
* C .  Utility is still given by U and 
* U , as defined in section 2, with 
suitable reinterpretation.   
  In each country, final output is distributed by a competitive distribution sector.  The 
distribution sector produces the final good using inputs from home and foreign monopolists.  The 
production function for final output in the home country is given by 
(23) 
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The production function for output in the foreign country is identical.  Note that this is simply the 
utility function from section 2, but now in the guise of a production function in which final 
output, X, is produced from goods manufactured in the home country,  H X , and goods 
manufactured in the foreign country,  F X , using CES technology.  These terms, in turn, are CES  
 14
aggregates.   H X  is an aggregate of a continuum of goods produced in the home country, and 
F X  is an analogous function for goods produced in the foreign country. 
  The cost of final output is determined from the cost function: 
(24)   () λ λ λ α α − − − − + = Γ 1
1
1 1 ) 1 ( F H P P . 
This, of course, is identical to the price index defined in equation (2) in section 2.  We assume 
the distribution sector is competitive, and there is free entry.  In cases in which distributors do 
not set prices in advance (that is, in our reinterpretation of the flexible-price model, the PCP 
model, and the LCP model),  Γ = P . 
  Equations (6) can be reinterpreted as derived demand curves.  Total market demand for 
home-produced and foreign-produced goods is then: 
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The rest of the model of section 2 goes through unchanged. 
  The PCP and LCP models can be interpreted as having a distribution sector that sells the 
consumer good at the cost of producing it.  The PCP model, then, is one in which there is full 
pass-through of exchange rates to imported goods.  Producers of intermediate goods set prices in 
their own currency.  The distributors then sell the final good at cost to consumers.  Exchange rate 
changes are passed along to consumers to the extent that foreign goods are used in the output of 
final goods.   
  The LCP model is now one in which there is no pass-through of exchange rates to import 
prices.  Home producers, for example, set one price for sale to distributors in their own country 
(denominated in the home country’s currency), and another price set in foreign currency for sale  
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to distributors in the foreign country.  Again, distributors sell the good at cost to consumers.  So, 
consumer prices in each country are fixed in the consumers’ currency. 
  Consider a third possibility: full pass-through to import prices, but local-currency pricing 
for consumers.  Such a configuration is more consistent with the empirical evidence of very low 
pass-through of exchange rates to consumer prices, but greater pass-through to import prices.  
The model I describe here is related closely to, and is really a mix between, the models of 
Devereux, Engel and Tille (1999) and Obstfeld (2001).  McCallum and Nelson (2000) make 
similar assumptions. 
  This model, then, is completely consistent with the observation that consumer prices do 
not respond much to exchange rate changes in the short run.  But there is still an important role 
for exchange-rate flexibility in changing relative prices.  The final goods producers face a 
“sourcing” decision – to use imported intermediates or locally produced intermediates.  There is 
not perfect substitutability between the two, but there is some – an elasticity of λ , to be precise.
4  
So, a nominal exchange rate adjustment can change the price of imported relative to locally 
produced intermediates. 
  There is a single final consumer good, sold by the competitive distribution sector that 
buys intermediate inputs in competitive markets.  We assume distributors are risk neutral.  The 
price of the final good in the home country is P , and it is fixed in home-currency.  Distributors 
can enter the market before the realization of shocks.  Since the sector is competitive, and 
distributors are risk neutral, entry occurs until expected profits are driven to zero.  The price set 
ex ante for consumers is equal to the expected cost of goods. 
                                                 
4  In Obstfeld’s framework there is a unitary elasticity of substitution.  In Devereux, Engel, and Tille (1999), it is 
zero.  
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  The cost of producing the consumption good is not fixed ex ante.  We assume that  H P  
and 
*
F P  are fixed ex ante.  For the home distributors, there is full pass-through of the exchange 
rate into the price they must pay for foreign intermediate goods, 
*
F F SP P = .  So, using equation 
(24), the cost of a unit of final output is given by: 
(26)  () λ λ λ λ α α − − − − − + = Γ 1
1
1 * 1 1 ) 1 ( F H P S P . 
  Potentially there are wealth effects from exchange rate changes in this case.  When the 
home currency depreciates, it raises the price that local distributors must pay for imported 
intermediate goods and lowers their profits.  Prices are fixed for consumers (and hence their 
demand is fixed.)  With risk-neutral distributors and free entry ex ante, we have  ) (Γ = E P .  So, 
home distributors suffer a loss in profits when the exchange rate increases.  Foreign distributors 
have a windfall gain.  But, as in Devereux, Engel and Tille (1999), these profit effects are not 
consequential because of the assumption of complete markets.   
With fixed nominal prices, we have for example in the home country 
*
F
H
F
H
SP
P
P
P
= .  Since 
H P  and 
*
F P  will be fixed under the market conditions described, we need exchange rate 
flexibility to allow relative price adjustment.  Indeed, since 
* M
M
S = with a suitably designed 
monetary policy of the form  η / k M =  and 
* * * /η k M = , the flexible price outcome for relative 
prices, equation (12), can be reproduced. 
But such a policy will necessarily lead to deviations from purchasing power parity.  The 
policy described above implies the nominal and real consumption exchange rate fluctuates with 
supply shocks, because P and 
* P  are fixed ex ante:  
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η
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P
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= . 
When purchasing power parity does not hold, then risk sharing is not perfect.  There is a 
deviation from the flexible price outcome of 
* C C = . 
  There is a genuine trade-off facing monetary policy makers concerning the flexibility of 
nominal exchange rates.  If nominal exchange rates moved enough, the relative prices facing 
distributors would be the same as under flexible goods prices (and PCP).  Distributors would be 
getting the correct price signals.  But that type of exchange-rate flexibility leads to deviations 
from PPP, which lead to undesirable consequences for risk sharing. 
  Conversely, if monetary policy were set so that the exchange rate was kept fixed at its 
PPP level, the risk-sharing goals could be met.  Indeed, as in the LCP model, monetary policy 
could be used to replicate aggregate consumption levels of the flexible price model, and such a 
policy is consistent with maintaining fixed exchange rates.  But, the drawback of such a policy is 
that distributors would be getting the wrong price signals.  Relative prices of home and foreign 
goods would not change in response to labor supply shocks.  There would be no response in 
home employment relative to foreign employment. 
  An optimal monetary policy must take both of these effects into consideration.  There is a 
tradeoff between achieving the efficient employment outcome, and eliminating deviations from 
the law of one price for consumers.  In a different set-up, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) make much 
the same point. 
 
7.  Conclusions   
  Recent theoretical papers demonstrate that optimal monetary policy can replicate a 
flexible price environment if nominal price stickiness is of the sort that prices are set in  
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producers’ currencies.  Nominal exchange rate movements can allow relative price adjustments 
to occur.  Empirical evidence appears to contradict this assumption, because consumer prices are 
not very responsive to exchange rates.  If there is no effect of exchange rates on prices that are 
paid by demanders of goods, then the exchange rate does not play the role of adjusting relative 
prices.  However, we have seen an interpretation that still assigns an important relative price role 
to the exchange rate, yet can reconcile the evidence of low exchange rate pass-through to 
consumer prices. 
  It is sometimes argued that in the presence of local-currency pricing, there is a prima 
facie case for stable nominal exchange rates.  Volatile nominal exchange rates can lead to large 
short-run deviations from the law of one price when goods prices are set in consumers’ 
currencies.  So, the case is made that fixing the exchange rate at the appropriate level can 
eliminate the distortion that arises when consumers face different prices for identical goods.  But 
Engel and Rogers (2001) demonstrate that the logic of this argument is not airtight.  Fixing the 
exchange rate, or joining a currency union, entails altering monetary policy, which in itself has 
welfare implications.  That paper produces a simple example to show that the loss of 
independence of monetary policy might entail a cost equal in size to the welfare costs of 
deviations from the law of one price.  Devereux and Engel (2001) find fixed exchange rates are 
optimal under LCP when monetary policy rules are optimal.  The example in Engel and Rogers 
(2001) is one where exchange rates are fixed but monetary policy rules are suboptimal. 
  The example of Engel and Rogers (2001), as well as all of the models discussed here 
assume that the exchange rate is driven by monetary and real factors, and there is no significant 
role for speculative bubbles.  If bubbles are important in determining exchange rates, then 
perhaps a stronger case for fixed exchange rates or currency union can be made.  Bubbles would 
cause real distortions, especially under local currency pricing.    
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  The new open economy macroeconomics has given us a structured way to think about the 
issues that are important when considering the desirability of floating exchange rates versus 
currency union.  Unfortunately for policy makers facing a near-term deadline for choosing an 
exchange-rate system, our knowledge has not advanced far enough to offer a firm 
recommendation backed up by appropriate theory.  We will undoubtedly see many advances in 
this area of research over the next decade, further refining the models to determine exactly what 
matters for the choice of exchange rate regime.  In addition, the models point the direction for 
empirical researchers to take to gather the precise information we need to calibrate the size of the 
expenditure-switching role for exchange rates. 
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